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ASSET DYNAMICS, LIQUIDITY, AND INEQUALITY
IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS
MAURIZIO IACOPETTA and RAOUL MINETTI∗
The Kiyotaki andWright model has exerted a considerable influence on the monetary
search literature. We argue that the model also delivers important insights into a
broader range of macroeconomic and development issues. The analysis studies how
market frictions and the liquidity of assets affect the distribution of income. Experiments
illustrate how the economy adjusts to shocks to asset returns and to the matching
technology. They also deal with long-run transition. An experiment interprets the
reversal of fortune hypothesis as a situation in which an economy with a low-return
asset takes over a similar economy with a high-return asset. (JEL C61, C63, E41, E27,
D63)
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the dynamic general equilibrium
theory is based on the idea that individuals trade
goods and services in centralized markets. The
assumption that agents trade against a budget
line can be a useful simplification when running
macroeconomic experiments, but sometimes it
washes away phenomena that emerge from the
interaction of individuals that differ in some
fundamental aspects. The Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) framework (hereafter KW) has been
widely praised for its capacity to connect indi-
viduals’ behavior with aggregate outcomes.
The presence of genuinely heterogenous agents
trading commodities in decentralized markets
implies that aggregate relationships are not
simply the magnification of a representative
individual behavior. However, it also poses
an important hurdle when obtaining dynamic
equilibria, a necessary step for studying the
adjustment of the economy toward a long-run
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equilibrium. Indeed, despite its considerable
influence on the search literature (see Lagos,
Rocheteau, and Wright 2017) KW has hardly
been used to perform macroeconomic experi-
ments. Building on a methodology discussed
in Iacopetta (2018) and Bonetto and Iacopetta
(2018), we show that the connections between
microbehavior and aggregate variables offered
by the KW framework can shed light on a wide
range of facts that have been studied both by
macro and development scholars.1 In particu-
lar, the setup allows us to relate the frictions
of market transactions and the dynamics of
income inequality and productivity to the trading
strategies of individuals. The experiments we
propose emphasize mechanisms of this class of
decentralized models that are usually absent both
1. An important feature of our approach that differenti-
ates it from previous attempts in studying dynamic patterns
in KW is that it does not require any ad hoc assumption on
agents’ ability to process or access information: agents are
rational, forward-looking, with full knowledge of the distribu-
tion of assets and of the trading strategies of other individuals.
Conversely,Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, andMatsui (1993),Wright
(1995), Luo (1999), and Sethi (1999) search for equilibria in a
similar environment using evolutionary dynamics. Marimon,
McGrattan, and Sargent (1990) explore how artificially intel-
ligent agents can learn to play speculative equilibrium.
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NE: Nash Equilibrium
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in macroeconomic models with centralized trade
and in search models with symmetric equilibria.
One application revisits the “reversal of for-
tune” hypothesis. This contends that a country
with a large initial endowment may, in the long
run, be undertaken by a country with a more
modest initial endowment, because the latter is
more prone to developing market-oriented activ-
ities (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002
and Engerman and Sokoloff 1997). In our exper-
iment, an economy that has larger returns on a
class of assets selects a long-run equilibrium that
is less productive than that selected by an econ-
omy that exhibits more modest asset returns. The
low-return economy takes over the high-return
economy because in the former agents choose to
trade and produce more intensively.
A second experiment uses trading frictions, a
core feature of the model, to interpret the ram-
ifications of market reforms. It reveals that if
reforms ameliorate the matching technology, a
more equitable distribution of income may fol-
low, because assets become more liquid. There
are two main reasons for inequality in our frame-
work: (1) assets fetch different returns and every
individual is allowed to carry only one type of
asset at a time; (2) assets differ in their degree of
liquidity. Although individuals have equal oppor-
tunities in accessing the decentralized market,
the odds that a match leads to the maximum
gain (which comes by acquiring the consumption
goods) varies both across individuals and across
time. The exercise will explain that liquidity can
squeeze or magnify inequality. A general pattern
that emerges is that when a shock induces some
agents to play “speculative” strategies, income
inequality shrinks because more frequent market
interactions tend to correct inequality as a result
of the variance of returns.
A third set of experiments focuses on equi-
libria selection. The recent financial crisis has
revived the interest in multiple equilibria not
only among scholars but also in the specialized
press (Wolf 2018). It has been noted that finan-
cial crises not only lower liquidity and depress
income (Kiyotaki and Moore 2012) but can also
bring the level of inequality up (see Atkinson
and Morelli 2011). Income inequality increased
in Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea in the
aftermath of the 1997 East Asian crisis (Lee
2016). The relatively high level of inequality in
Latin America has also been partly attributed
to frequent episodes of crisis (Fallon and Lucas
2002; Galbraith and Lu 2001; Gasparini and
Lustig 2011; Lustig 2000). In our environment,
the real consequences on the average income and
on income distribution caused by a shock to the
rates of return on holdings are conditioned by
equilibria selection.
The rest of the article unfolds as follows.
The next section briefly describes the economic
environment, illustrates the evolution of the
distribution of holdings under a given profile of
strategies, and defines the best response functions
of three types of representative agents. Section
III defines macroeconomic indicators. Section
IV proposes three types of macroeconomic
experiments: One illustrates a case of fortune
reversal between two economies. A second one
follows the responses to a shock that improves
the matching rate. A third set of experiments
studies the fluctuations in liquidity and produc-
tion caused by a shock to one of the assets’ rates
of return. Section V concludes.
II. THE MODEL ECONOMY
There are three differences with respect to the
decentralized economy described in KW. First, to
facilitate the description of the dynamics, time
is continuous rather than discrete. Second, we
extend the model to consider “commodities” that
generate positive returns (Lucas trees) rather than
entailing costs of storage (a similar extension is
also presented in Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright
2017). We also allow the ranking of assets with
respect to their returns to change, as this gives
us freedom of running experiments in which the
economy can switch across different equilibria.
Third, as in Wright (1995), agents are not nec-
essarily equally distributed across types—again
an extension motivated to increase the type of
equilibria that can emerge. However, we retain
the assumption, which has been subject to legit-
imate criticisms that there is a limit on the indi-
vidual’s amount of holding. While relaxing this
assumption might deliver a more realistic assess-
ment of the magnitude of the responses of pro-
duction and income to a shock, it would also
make the dynamic analysis more complex.2 As
it will become clear soon, even under the storage
capacity constraint, the investment decision plays
a key role in the dynamics. In particular, in one
version of the model, the emergence of a high-
production equilibrium is induced by the decision
2. Examples of influential works with a similar asset-
holding restriction are Diamond (1982), Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1987), Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), and Duffie,
Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
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of one group of individuals to give up a fraction
of the current rents on holdings to increase the
frequency of trade.
A brief description of the economy follows.
There are three types of individuals, denoted by 1,
2, and 3. Each type consists of a large number of
people,Ni, for i = 1, 2, and 3. The fraction of each
type is μi = Ni/N, where N is the overall size of
the population
(
N =
∑
i
Ni
)
. People live forever.
An agent of type i derives utility exclusively from
consuming good i and can produce only good
i + 1 (modulo 3). Production takes place immedi-
ately after consumption. Type-i’s3 instantaneous
utility from consumption and the disutility of pro-
ducing good i + 1 are denoted by Ui and Di,
respectively, and their difference is ui = Ui − Di.
There is a capacity constraint. At each instant
of time, an individual can hold only one unit
of some storable good i that offers an instanta-
neous return ri ≤ 0, measured in units of utility
(the terms good, commodity, inventory, and asset
will be used interchangeably). The return of good
i is the same for all agents of any type. The dis-
count rate is denoted by ρ > 0.
A pair of agents is randomly and uniformly
chosen from the population to meet for a possible
trade. The matching process is governed by a
Poisson process of intensity α. A meeting does
not necessarily mean that the two parties trade. A
bilateral trade occurs if and only if it is mutually
agreeable. If both agents want what the other has,
they swap goods. Otherwise, they part company
and keep the same good in the inventory as they
wait for the next call. Agent i always accepts good
i and consumes it immediately upon reception.
Therefore, agent i enters the market either with
one unit of good i + 1 or with one unit of good
i + 2.
The proportion of type i agents that hold good
j at time t is denoted by pi, j(t). Then, the vector
p̃ (t) =
{
pi,j (t)
}
for i = 1, 2, and 3 and j = 1, 2,
and 3 describes the state of the economy at time t
(from now on, it is understood that i and j go from
1 to 3). However, because pi, i(t)= 0,
(1) pi,i+1 (t) + pi,i+2 (t) = μi,
for any t> 0, the state of the economy can
be represented in a more parsimonious way by
p(t)= {p1, 2(t), p2, 3(t), p3, 1(t)}. An individual
i has only to decide whether to exchange her
3. When no confusion arises, we will use the loose lan-
guage of calling an agent of type i simply as agent or individ-
ual i, or for short type-i.
production good for the other type of good.
Type-i’s choice at time t of giving up good i+ 1
for i+ 2 (indirect trade) is denoted with τi(t)= 1;
the opposite choice is indicated with τi(t)= 0.
Hence, the objective of agent i is to select a time
path τi(t) that maximizes her expected stream
of present and future net utility, given other
agents’ paths of strategies, 𝛉(t)= [θ1(t), θ2(t),
θ3(t)], and the distribution of goods p(t), for any
t> 0. Formally, letΔi(s)≡Vi, i+ 1(s)−Vi, i+ 2(s),4
and let τ̃i (s; 𝛉 (s) , p (s)) denote the optimal (or
best) response profile of strategies of representa-
tive agent i to other players’ strategies 𝛉(s) along
the pattern of inventories p(s) for s> t. Then, the
optimal choice can be characterized as follows5:
(2) τ̃i (s; 𝛉 (s) , p (s)) =
{
1 ifΔi (s) < 0
0 otherwise,
for any s≥ t. Finally, if all agents of the same
type adopt the same set of strategies, so that
τi(t)=θi(t) for every i, for a given 𝛉(t) the distri-
bution of assets evolves as follows (the time index
is dropped):
ṗ1,2 = α
{
p1,3
[
p2,1
(
1 − θ2
)
+ p3,1
(3)
+p3,2
(
1 − θ1
)]
− p1,2p2,3θ1
}
,
ṗ2,3 = α
{
p2,1
[
p3,2
(
1 − θ3
)
+ p1,2
(4)
+p1,3
(
1 − θ2
)]
− p2,3p3,1θ2
}
,
ṗ3,1 = α
{
p3,2
[
p1,3
(
1 − θ1
)(5)
+p2,3 + p2,1
(
1 − θ3
)]
− p3,1p1,2θ3
}
.
The terms inside the brackets before the minus
sign in Equation (3) calculate the fraction of type
1 agents that is called for a match while hold-
ing good 3, and that ends up in the position
of carrying good 2. Such an event materializes
either because of barter or because the type 1
agents leave the meeting with good 1, consume it,
4. Appendix S1 contains the analytical expressions for
Vi, i + 1 and Vi, i + 2.
5. Observe that the analysis focuses on pure strategy equi-
libria. Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1993) show that allow-
ing for mixed strategies gives rise to dynamic equilibria that
include cycles, sunspots, and other non-Markovian equilib-
ria. Renero (1998), however, argues that it is hard to find an
initial condition from which an equilibrium pattern converges
to a mixed strategy steady state equilibrium. More recently,
Oberfield and Trachter (2012) have found that, in a symmet-
ric environment, as the frequency of search increases, cycles
and multiplicity in mixed strategy tend to disappear.
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and then immediately produce good 2. The term
after the minus sign accounts for events in which
type 1 agents enter trades with good 2 and end
up with good 3. A similar interpretation applies
to Equations (3)–(5). The behavior of pi, i + 2 is
derived through Equation (1).
As we focus on patterns that converge to a
steady state, it is important to clarify when such
a convergence occurs. Equations (3)–(5) suggest
that convergence should depend on the set of
strategies θi. As there are 23 = 8 possible strate-
gies, eight is also the number of steady state
equilibria that can emerge. The following propo-
sition states that seven out of the eight equilibria
are locally stable.
PROPOSITION 1. Under any time-constant
profiles of strategies 𝛉, p(t), with the possible
exception of 𝛉= (1, 1, 1), the system of Equations
(3)–(5) converges to a stationary distribution,
from any initial position.6
Proof. Appendix S1, Supporting information,
contains the proof for seven cases and also
explains that while sufficient conditions of con-
vergence cannot be established for the remaining
case (1,1,1), this strategy hardly supports a Nash
equilibrium (NE). ◾
We now turn to the definition of a NE.
A. Definition of a NE.
Given an initial distribution of inventories
p(0)= p0, a NE is a path of strategies 𝛉*(t)
together with a distribution of inventories p*(t)
such that for all t > 0:
i. p*(t) and 𝛉*(t) satisfy the dynamics
Equations (3–5) with the initial condition
p*(0)= p0, and subject to the constraint (1);
ii. For all t > 0, every agent maximizes his or
her expected utility given the profile of strategies
of the rest of the population;
iii. τ̃i
(
t; 𝛉∗ (t) , p∗ (t)
)
= θ∗i (t) for all t > 0.
Observe that the definition is not restricted to a
stationary state.While it is in general not possible
to derive analytically all the dynamic Nash equi-
libria, it is possible to characterize all the Nash
steady state equilibria, for a given distribution of
the population across the three types. An example
is given by the following proposition.
6. For the profile of strategies (1,1,1), proving that p(t)
converges to a fixed point is more challenging. But such
profile of strategy happens not to be a steady state Nash
equilibrium (see Proposition 2).
TABLE 1
Steady State Equilibria
Strategies
Assets
Distribution Strategies
Assets
Distribution
(0,1,0) 1
3
[
1, 1
2
, 1
]
(1,1,0) 1
3
[a, b, 1]
(1,0,0) 1
3
[
1
2
, 1, , , 1
]
(1,0,1) 1
3
[b, 1, a]
(0,0,1) 1
3
[
1, , , 1, 1
2
]
(0,1,1) 1
3
[1, a, b]
Note: a ≡ 1
2
√
2 and b ≡
√
2 − 1.
PROPOSITION 2. When the population is
equally split across the three types, the six steady
state NE reported in Table 1 exist. In some cases,
a pair of NE coexists.
Proof. See Appendices S1 and S2. ◾
Which of the equilibria reported in Table 1
emerges depends crucially on the specification of
the returns on assets. For example, in Model A of
KW, that in the current framework corresponds
to the return configuration r3 < r2 < r1, the only
two possible (pure strategy) equilibria are
(6) 𝛉 = (0, 1, 0) and p = 1
3
(1, 1∕2, 1) ,
that exists if
(7)
r2 − r3
u1α
> p3,1 − p2,1 = 1∕6
and
(8)
𝛉 = (1, 1, 0) and p = 1
3
(1
2
√
2,
√
2 − 1, 1
)
,
that exists if
(9)
r2 − r3
u1α
< p3,1 − p2,1 =
√
2
3
(√
2 − 1
)
,
where the pi, j in the inequalities (7) and (9) are
evaluated in the respective steady states. A joint
reading of conditions (7) and (9) reveals that the
two equilibria—usually referred to, respectively,
as fundamental and speculative equilibrium, in
reference to the trading strategy followed by type-
1 agents—cannot coexist. The two equilibria are
summarized in row R1 of Table 2. The specifica-
tions r2 < r1 < r3 and r1 < r3 < r2 would generate
also unique steady state equilibria (see Table 2A).
Under any of the three configurations of
return just reviewed, multiple equilibria can be
obtained by changing the pattern of specializa-
tion. For instance, Model B in KW is obtained
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TABLE 2
Steady State Equilibria, Strategies, and Money
Returns F S
Assets
(F)
Assets
(S)
M
(F)
M
(S)
Panel A
R1 r3 < r2 < r1 (0,1,0) (1,1,0)
1
3
[
1, 1
2
, 1
]
1
3
[a, b, 1] 1 1,3
R2 r2 < r1 < r3 (1,0,0) (1,0,1)
1
3
[
1
2
, 1, 1
]
1
3
[b, 1, a] 3 2,3
R3 r1 < r3 < r2 (0,0,1) (0,1,1)
1
3
[
1, 1 1
2
]
1
3
[1, a, b] 2 1,2
Panel B
R4 r2 < r3 < r1 (1,1,0) (1,0,1)
1
3
[a, b, 1] 1
3
[b, 1, a] 1, 3 2, 3
R5 r3 < r1 < r2 (0,1,1) (1,1,0)
1
3
[1, a, b] 1
3
[a, b, 1] 1, 2 1, 3
R6 r1 < r2 < r3 (1,0,1) (0,1,1)
1
3
[b, 1, a] 1
3
[1, a, b] 3, 2 1, 2
Notes: a ≡ 1
2
√
2 and b ≡
√
2 − 1. The F and S columns contain the triplet (θ1, θ2, θ3) that describes the fundamental and
the speculative steady state strategy, respectively. The following two columns are the assets’ stationary distributions: [p1, 2, p2, 3,
p3, 1]. The last two columns indicate which asset is traded indirectly—or acts as “money”—in the fundamental and speculative
equilibrium, respectively. In rows R1 through R3, the equilibria are unique; only one type of agent plays speculative strategies
in the S equilibrium. In the R4–R6 rows, the two equilibria may coexist; two types of agents play speculative strategies in the S
equilibrium.
TABLE 3
Baseline Parameters
Population Discount Matching Utility Returns
μi δ α ui r1 r2 r3
1
3
0.03 1 1 0.21 0.2 or 0.1 0
Notes: When r2 = 0.2, the economy converges to the fundamental equilibrium (0,1,0), whereas when r2 = 0.1 it converges to
the speculative equilibrium (1,1,0). The steady state capital income share is 0.37 and 0.51, for the fundamental and speculative
equilibrium, respectively.
as a variation of Model A by assuming that
agent i produces i + 2 instead of good i + 1.
As observed in Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright
(2017), an equivalent environment with multiple
equilibria can also be created with the same pro-
duction specialization of Model A (type-i agent
produces good i + 1) by changing the ordering
of returns. This is the approach we follow here.
Table 2B reports the three returns ordering that
create a Model B-type of the environment. For
instance if r2 < r3 < r1 (Table 2B, R4), a (1,1,0)
NE always exists and a (1,0,1) equilibrium exists
if
(10) p3,2 >
r1 − r3
αu2
(11) p1,3 − p2,3 <
r2 − r1
αu3
with p3,2 =
(
1 − 1
2
√
2
)
∕3, p1,3 =
(
2 −
√
2
)
∕3,
and p2, 3 = 1/3. Hence, if conditions (10)–(11)
hold, the economy exhibits multiple steady states.
III. MACROECONOMIC INDICES
The dynamics of the economy will be char-
acterized through the behavior of liquidity, pro-
duction, and inequality of income and welfare. A
formal definition of these quantities follows.
A. Liquidity
The model delivers several liquidity indices
that are comparable to those used in empirical
macroeconomics. First, the stock of each of the
three assets, xi, can be interpreted as “market
thickness”—a measure of how easy it is to find
an asset on the market. A second measure of
liquidity is the “frequency of trade,” ti, that
measures the number of times good i is traded
in a unit of time. The ratio ti/xi is sometimes
called the velocity of circulation. KW proposes
also the level of “acceptability” of an asset
in a trade, ai = ti/oi, as an index of liquidity,
where oi is the frequency with which good i is
offered in a period of time. The variable ai is, by
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construction, bounded between zero and one. It
captures the probability that an asset is traded,
given that someone offers it.7
B. Production
It is easier to first deal with the flow of con-
sumption. Let cids be the fraction of agents of
type i in the overall population that consumes
goods between times s and s + ds. Then, the rate
of consumption for type i individuals is
ci = pi,i+1
(
pi+1,i + pi+2,iθi+2
)
+ pi,i+2
[
pi+1,i
(
1 − θi+1
)
+ pi+2,i
]
.
As production immediately follows consump-
tion, ci also represents the rate of production
of good i + 1. Aggregate production is
∑
i μici.
In steady state, ci = ci + 1. Clearly, the level of
ci is affected by the distribution of skills. If
a good is produced by a small fraction of the
population, the economy is trapped in a low-
production equilibrium.
C. Income
Because prices are all set to one, the average
flow of income generated by agents of type i
holding good i + 1 and i + 2 is
gi,i+1 =
(
pi+1,i + pi+2,iθi+2
)
+ ri+1
and
gi,i+2 =
[
pi+1,i
(
1 − θi+1
)
+ pi+2,i
]
+ ri+2,
respectively. Interpreting ri+ 1 and ri+ 2 as capital
income, and the rest as labor income, national
income is
∑
i
∑
j pi,jgi,j.
D. Inequality
Income and welfare inequality are computed
with a Gini coefficient that measures the area
comprised between a 45∘ line and the Lorenz
curve. The population is split into six income
groups according to gi, j, and into six welfare
groups on the basis of the value functions Vi, j.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section proposes three types of sim-
ulations with economies of the type listed in
Table 2A. While several steady state equilibria
7. Appendix S1 illustrates the formal derivation of ti, xi,
and oi.
can emerge, for a given specification of
preferences, and of production and matching
technology, there is a unique steady state equi-
librium. Therefore, in some of the simulations
discussed in this section when, a result of a
shock, a new steady state equilibrium emerges an
old one vanishes. Scenarios with multiple steady
states are discussed in Appendix S2.
A. Reversal of Fortune over the Transition
The first application of the dynamics of the
model economy addresses the conjecture that,
since the work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2002), has been known as “reversal
of fortune” theory. Europeans in areas of relative
affluence such as Mesoamerica and Andes privi-
leged, according to the theory, the short-run goal
of extracting resources and neglected the devel-
opment of institutions that encourage investment
and growth. In one of the first formulations of
this hypothesis, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997)
argued that initial inequality in wealth and
human capital conditioned subsequent patterns
of development in Latin American countries.
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) observe that
although British and Latin American colonies
in the New World began with similar legal and
cultural background, and attracted immigrants
from similar places and economic classes, they
evolved quite distinct societies and sets of eco-
nomic institutions. The Spanish practices of
awarding claims and land, native labor, and
rich mineral resources to members of the elite
generated a large wealth disparity in the Spanish
colonies of Mexico and Peru. In contrast, in the
northern colonies of North America the regime
of mixed farming centered on grains and live-
stock meant a more equal distribution of wealth:
“[T]he circumstances on these latter regions
[northern colonies of North America] encour-
aged the evolution of more equal distribution of
wealth, more democratic political institutions,
more extensive domestic markets and the pursuit
of more growth-oriented policies than did those
in the former [Spanish colonies of Mexico and
Peru]” (p. 263).
While the reversal of fortune hypothesis has
been widely debated from an empirical stand-
point (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, for an
overview and Fukuyama 2014, ch. 16 and ch. 21
for a more critical assessment), formal analysis
is lacking. We interpret the divergence patterns
of development between the Spanish and North
American colonies as an equilibrium selection
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FIGURE 1
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Notes: For parameters see Table 3. The top-left plot is a partial view of the evolution of the assets’ distribution of two
similar economies that share the same initial condition. The economy with r2 = 0:1 converges to the speculative NE (1,1,0) and
the economy with r2 = 0:2 converges to the fundamental equilibrium (0,1,0). The curves of the remaining plots are ratios or
differences of the speculative economy’s time series relative to the ones of the fundamental economy. The numbers inside the
three right plots identify the type of asset traded.
driven by different levels of initial inequality.
The mechanism that we illustrate starts from
the premises, as emphasized in the empirical
literature just discussed, that initially the more
unequal country is also wealthier. Specifically, in
the economy that we identify with Latin Amer-
ica, the return on assets produced by type 1
agents is higher than in the other economy,
that is the northern colonies of North Amer-
ica. This difference captures the basic idea that
in Latin America the set of institutions created
the conditions to extract more rents relative to
North America. In our setting, the country with
more equal wealth distribution converges to the
speculative equilibrium, while the country with
the skewed distribution converges to the fun-
damental equilibrium. In our interpretation of
equilibrium selection, the country with the lower
discrepancy in the return of the three assets is
the one featuring institutions of “higher quality.”
The analysis implies, in accordance with what
was observed by Engerman and Sokoloff, that
the economy with lower inequality and a rela-
tively more modest initial rent on assets, develops
a more extensive market and generates a greater
volume of production. By contrast, the country
with the highest return on assets in the long run
exhibits a poorer performance, because agents
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have no incentive to trade and market liquidity
remains low.
In the language of the model, consider two
economies that are similar in all respects except
that in one (S-economy) the return on good 2 is
lower than in the other (the F-economy). The
returns satisfy r3 < r2 < r1 in both economies.
With the initial distribution of inventories, only
good 1 is used in indirect trading in either
economy. Over the transition, as the difference
between p3, 1 and p2, 1 increases (top-left plot
of Figure 1), good 3 becomes relatively more
marketable than good 2. In the S-economy, where
the good 2 commands a smaller return than in
the F-economy, good 3 emerges as an asset
exchanged in indirect trading,8 whereas in the
F-economy it does not. Said differently, in the
F-economy agents 1 choose to obtain a higher
fraction of their income from hoarding capital.
Conversely, in the S-economy agents are willing
to give up some capital income and to be more
active in production.9
Except for inequality, the two economies
exhibit similar macroeconomic and financial
indicators until type 1 agents of the S-economy
change their strategies. From then on, the S-
economy performs better. Aggregate production
is larger, mostly thanks to an expansion in the
production of good 3 (the production of good 1
is relatively smaller for a while in the S-economy
because of a sudden drop in its marketability).
The middle-left graph of Figure 1 contains the
key insight of the exercise: The F-economy has
an initial advantage in terms of income because
of the higher returns in asset 2. Nevertheless,
this initial advantage induces F-economy’s type
1 agents to play fundamental strategies, whereas
their counterparts in the S-economy engage in
indirect trading. The reversal emerges gradually
as the market thickness and the frequency of
trade of good 3 become significantly large to
compensate type 1 agents for the loss of their
rental income.
The crossing between the two economies
occurs also with respect to income inequality
(bottom-left graph of Figure 1). In the F-
economy, the group of type 2 individuals holding
8. The literature sometimes refers to this phenomenon as
the emergence of commodity money.
9. Specifically, the S-economy converges to the specula-
tive equilibrium 𝛉 = (1, 1, 0), p = 1
3
[ 1
2
√
2,
√
2 − 1, 1], and
the F-economy to the fundamental equilibrium 𝛉 = (0, 1, 0),
p = 1
3
[1, 1
2
, 1]. Appendix S1 states the conditions for the exis-
tence of these equilibria.
TABLE 4
Reversal of Fortune
Bottom/Top Gini
Capital
Share
Panel A: Fundamental Equilibrium
Initial position 0.1840 0.1091 0.3685
Steady state 0 0.1131 0.5074
Panel B: Speculative Equilibrium
Initial position 0.1840 0.1235 0.3110
Steady state 0.5283 0.0595 0.3633
Notes: The first column of panel A shows the ratio
between the bottom and the top income level at the initial
point of the transition and when the economy reaches the
fundamental steady state (see Figure 1). For parameters’ spec-
ification, see Table 3. The second and third columns report the
initial and final values of the Gini index, and of the average
capital income share, respectively. In steady state, the bottom
income group consists of type 2 individuals holding good 3.
Their income is zero because they have no immediate prospect
of obtaining a consumption good and have no capital income
(r3 = 0). Panel B shows similar data for the economy that con-
verges to the speculative steady state with r2 = 0.1. (In the
initial phase of the transition agents 1 also play fundamental
strategies.)
good 3 converges to a zero income. These indi-
viduals do not earn any capital rent, and do not
have any immediate prospect of trading their
holding against a consumption good. Conversely,
because in the S-economy good 3 is accepted by
type 1 agents, the average income at the lower
end is about half of that of the richest group (see
Table 4).
B. Market Frictions
The second experiment is inspired by episodes
of structural reforms, such as those enacted by
South Korea and other East Asian countries in
the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis,
aimed at increasing the flexibility of markets and
reducing allocative frictions. In South Korea,
the reforms reduced the obstacles to the reallo-
cation process in financial markets by deterring
the continuous rollover of credit relationships
that had characterized the precrisis period. The
reforms, for instance, facilitated banks’ screen-
ing of applicants and thus raised banks’ ability
to create matches with firms and to reallocate
loans (Chamley and Rochon 2011). Although the
model lacks some of the institutional details, such
as banks, it allows us to study the consequences
of a more fluid market by studying agents’
responses to an increase in the matching rate α.
The immediate effect of the shock that lifts up
α is a boost in production and national income,
reflecting the more frequent trading activity. In
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TABLE 5
Market Frictions
Steady State Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
F (preshock) 0 0.1131 0.5074
S (postshock) 0.6274 0.0467 0.2757
Notes: The matching technology improves by 50%. The
initial set of parameters is depicted in Table 3, with r2 = 0.2.
The economy transits from the fundamental to the speculative
steady state, where trading is more frequent (Figure 2).
the experiment depicted in Figure 2, initially the
economy is on a fundamental steady state (0,1,0)
when it is hit by a shock that rises the match-
ing parameter α by 50%. The frequency of trade
in assets 2 and 3 doubles immediately after the
shock; the acceptability indices of these two
assets also increase substantially. Interestingly,
the shock also affects the distribution of assets,
as it causes the economy to transit from a funda-
mental to a speculative steady state equilibrium.
As a result, income inequality declines, because
the holders of assets 2 and 3 earn a more meager
capital income, relative to asset 1 holders. The
top-right plot indicates that the volume of asset
2 shrinks, because this is partially replaced by
asset 3. As a larger stock of the wealth is invested
in a low-return asset, the fraction of the national
income generated by capital return goes down
significantly, the bottom to top income ratio rises,
and the level of inequality is significantly reduced
(Table 5).
In sum, a reduction of market frictions not
only boosts average income, but it also helps
reduce income disparity. An interesting compar-
ison can be drawn with the conclusion of the
literature that studies the interaction between
technological change and skills (see surveys
of Acemoglu 2002; Aghion 2002; Hornstein,
Krusell, and Violante 2005). The mechanism of
inequality dynamics here is derived by interact-
ing market transactions with the initial disparity
in endowments: each type of agent has specific
skills to generate a commodity whose return
can be higher or lower than that of commodities
produced by other types of agents. The improve-
ment in the matching technology, by increasing
the participation in the market, diminishes the
relative importance of premia on returns, because
a greater fraction of income is generated through
market exchange. Goldin and Katz (2008) argue
that in the first decades of the twentieth century
technological change smoothed out income
disparity in the United States, but it may have
had the opposite effect of increasing inequality
in more recent decades. However, Piketty (2014)
claims that the more recent rise in inequality is
rather because of a reinforcement of the rents
position of privileged groups and organizations
(next experiment explores this hypothesis).
The experiment also speaks to studies on
the effect of market reforms on inequality (see
Koo 2007, and Campos and Nugent 2015). The
evidence on this effect is ambiguous, as also
pointed out in recent, comprehensive reviews (see
Astarita and D’Adamo 2017). Our experiment
underscores the need to disentangle the impact
on the asset market liquidity when evaluating the
consequences of market reforms for inequality.
C. Shock to Asset Returns
The first experiment on the reversal of fortune
illustrated that the gap between r2 and r3 can
condition the path of development of the econ-
omy. Following the same intuition, we propose
an experiment in which the shock increases r2
and it is large enough to take away the econ-
omy from a speculative equilibrium and push it
toward a fundamental long-run equilibrium, but
not so large to alter the ranking of the rates of
return, that is, even after the shock r3 < r2 < r1
(next section deals with a case in which the shock
reshuffles the order of returns). The consequences
of a positive shock are that the economy’s aver-
age income goes down because of the change of
strategies of type 1 individuals, who, after the
shock, are happy to keep their production good,
which now generates a higher return, and trade
it only against their consumption good. Type 1’s
strategy switch causes a decline in the frequency
of trade. More precisely, the shock induces type 1
agents to give up indirect trading and to obtain a
larger fraction of their income from hoarding cap-
ital. Figure 3 shows that the frequency of trade
and the acceptability of assets decline. The liq-
uidity drop is associated with a reduction of both
national income and aggregate production. Wel-
fare inequality declines slightly, but there is a sub-
stantial rise in income inequality. By renouncing
to indirect trade, type 1 agents hoard asset 2 (see
the top-right plot) for longer periods. As asset 2
yields a better return than asset 3, a larger frac-
tion of agents 1’s income is now derived from
rents. Therefore, the gap between income and
production is larger after the shock (see the left-
middle graph of Figure 3). Because agents 2 face
worse odds in trading away their holdings and
they are also the ones that hold mostly the asset
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FIGURE 2
Market Frictions
0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
-1
0
1
2
F S
Phase Diagram
p21
13p
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Market Thickness
lo
g 
ra
tio
lo
g 
ra
tio
lo
g 
ra
tio
lo
g 
ra
tio
lo
g 
ra
tio
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
National Income and Production
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
Frequency of Trade
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
Inequality (difference)
Time (Years)
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Acceptability
Time (Years)
3
3
2
1
2
1
3
2
1
Welfare
Income
Aggregate Production
National Income
Notes: The preshock parameter values are in Table 3 with r2 = 0:1 (fundamental equilibrium). The shock raises the matching
parameter by 50%. The plots of ratios and differences are calculated with respect to the preshock state. The income capital share
and inequality measures are reported in Table 5.
with the lowest return, there is a dramatic drop
of the bottom/top income ratio. In fact, Table 6
indicates that income inequality doubles at the
end of the adjustment process and that the capital
income ratio goes up from 36% to 51%. The cor-
relation is in line with Piketty’s (2014) argument
that a higher interest rate leads to greater capital
income and to more inequality. Notice that here
the expansion in inequality is induced mostly
by the decline in liquidity (i.e., by rent-seeking
behavior). Despite the decline in national income
and liquidity, the middle-left plot of Figure 3
shows that the average income of type 1 agents
goes substantially up, because it benefits from the
higher returns of asset 2—a second major factor
contributing to the increased income inequality.
Discussion. The experiment generated a con-
temporaneous drop in liquidity and in national
income, as well as a rise in income inequality as
a result of a positive shock to r2. It should be
clear, however, that a similar scenario could be
obtained, perhaps even more intuitively, through
TABLE 6
Higher Return of Asset 2
Steady State Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
S (preshock) 0.5288 0.0594 0.3634
F (postshock) 0 0.1131 0.5074
Notes: Inequality and capital share variations as a result of
an increase in r2 from 0.1 to 0.2. For remaining parameters,
see Table 3. The economy transits from the speculative to the
fundamental equilibrium (Figure 3).
a negative shock to r3, as what matters for the
emergence of a long-run equilibrium is the differ-
ence r2 − r3 (see R1, Table 2). With this observa-
tion in mind, the model can be used to interpret
the drop of liquidity and national income that has
been observed in episodes of long crisis. These
include the “lost decade” of Japan of the 1990s,
which mostly originated from the accumulation
of bad-performing loans in the banking sector fol-
lowing an asset price drop, or also, more recently,
the slow recovery of some Southern European
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FIGURE 3
Higher Return of Asset 2
0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
-1
0
1
2
F S
Phase Diagram
p21
1
3
p
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
Market Thickness
oit
ar
g
ol
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Income and Production
oit
ar
g
ol
0 5 10 15 20
-1
-0.5
0
Frequency of Trade
oit
ar
g
ol
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
0
0.1
Inequality (difference)
Time (Years)
0 5 10 15 20
-1
-0.5
0
Acceptability
Time (Years)
oit
ar
g
ol
oit
ar
g
ol
National Income
2
1
3
3
3
2
2
1
Income
Welfare
1
Agents 1's Average Income
Aggregate Production
Notes: The preshock set of parameters is displayed in Table 3, with r2 = 0:1 (speculative equilibrium). The shock doubles the
rate of return on asset 2. The ratios and differences are calculated with respect to an economy in its speculative Nash steady state.
countries from the global crisis of 2008–2010.
These prolonged stagnations can affect inequal-
ity. For example, in Japan, in 1993 the Gini coef-
ficient was more than 2 percentage points higher
than in 1987 and by 2000 it exceeded the aver-
age of Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries (Bank of
Japan Survey of Business Conditions). Chiavacci
and Hommerich (2017) argue that, as a result of
the stagnation, Japan has transited from a grow-
ing economy regarded as an example of social
equality, to a “gap society” (kakusa shakai) where
inequality is deepening. A further example is pro-
vided by Italy, where the Gini index of income
inequality has been rising in the aftermath of the
global crisis, as pointed out by OECD (2011) and
Ballarino et al. (2012).10
10. There are also episodes in which it is the increase
in the return of one asset that leads the market for another
asset to stall. In recent years in European countries banks have
Ajello (2012), Shi (2012), and Del Negro
et al. (2016) also study the correlation between
liquidity and national income through adapta-
tions of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). These stud-
ies, however, do not consider the dynamics of
inequality. A growing empirical literature finds
that indeed crises affect inequality (see Atkin-
son and Morelli 2011). Evidence of an increase
in inequality has been found, for example, for
Malaysia and Singapore following the 1997 cri-
sis. For South Korea, Lee (2016) uncovers an
increase of inequality over the course of the East
Asian crisis. Studies on the crises of Latin Amer-
ica also suggest that these crises have often raised
inequality (Fallon and Lucas 2002; Galbraith
and Lu 2001; Gasparini and Lustig 2011; Lustig
2000). Furthermore, Atkinson andMorelli (2011)
increasingly held substantial amounts of government bonds
of core euro-area countries (especially Germany), perceived
to be an appealing investment. This has allegedly led banks to
reduce their involvement in the loan market.
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provide evidence of an increase in inequality after
theNordic crises of the 1990s, while various stud-
ies point to higher income inequality following
the 2008–2010 global crisis (see Piketty and Saez
2013).
Interestingly, in the studies mentioned above
the description of the nexus between crises and
inequality generally focuses on the direct effects
of the crises through changes in the returns of
assets and on the resulting change in the returns
to agents’ asset holdings. This includes the direct
impact of falling asset prices and returns, which
can especially affect the wealthy, or the effects
of the following declines in incomes on the
lower tail of the income distribution (see Atkin-
son and Morelli 2011, and references therein). In
our experiment, we instead disentangle the link
between crises and inequality through changes in
asset market liquidity.
D. Shock to Asset Returns: Multiple Switches
The previous experiment assumed, for sim-
plicity, that the shock would not change the
order of returns across the three assets. When it
does, however, there are broader effects on the
agents’ strategies because new long-run equilib-
ria emerge and existing equilibria vanish. In the
previous experiment, the transition from a (1,1,0)
equilibrium to a (0,1,0) equilibrium was caused
by positive shock to r2. We observed also that
similar results can be obtained through a nega-
tive shock to r3. Conversely, a positive shock to
r3 that is large enough to go over r1 triggers a
more articulated response of the economy as it
may induce two groups of agents to abandon their
current strategies. Figure 4 accounts for such a
scenario. As with the previous experiment, ini-
tially the economy is on a (1,1,0) equilibrium and
r3 < r2 < r1. Letting r
′
3 be the return observed
after the shock, we have that r2 < r1 < r
′
3. The
long-run consequences of this occurrence are eas-
ily grasped by comparing the equilibria of the R1
and R2 economies reported in Table 2. The ini-
tial state of the economy corresponds to the R1
speculative steady state. As a result of the shock,
the new equilibrium (1,0,1) emerges (see R2 of
Table 2). In the new steady state, type 3 rather
than type 1 agents play speculative strategies
(although type 1 agents do not change their trad-
ing behavior, indirect trade in the R2 economy
actually comes through fundamental strategies).
Inequality has a nonmonotonic adjustment. First,
it goes up, reflecting the greater capital income
disparity across groups, and then declines, as the
TABLE 7
Higher Return of Asset 3
Steady State Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
S of R1 (preshock) 0.5288 0.0594 0.3634
S of R2 (postshock) 0.7358 0.0241 0.4453
Notes: The rate of return of asset 3, r3, increases from
0 to 0.22. The remaining parameters are reported in Table 3,
with r2 = 0.2. The economy transits from the R1 speculative
equilibrium to the R2 speculative equilibrium (Figure 4).
patterns of trade partially level the playing field.
In particular, the shock and the responses that
it triggers make type 1 and type 2 agents better
off, whereas type 3 agents are worse off. Type
2 agents benefit as the return on the good they
produce goes up. Type 1 agents gain from the
fact that their production good is now more “liq-
uid,” for it is accepted in indirect trading. Con-
versely, type 3 agents lose from the shock because
their production good is no longer accepted in
indirect trading. Overall, Table 7 shows that the
shock rebalances substantially the income lev-
els of the poorest and richest individuals and
slashes the Gini index by half. Contrary to previ-
ous examples, however, this time there is a nega-
tive long-run correlation between inequality and
capital share, because the capital windfall goes to
type 2 agents that used to face the least favorable
trading odds. Furthermore, the liquidity of asset
1 and asset 3 move in opposite directions, a phe-
nomenon that also contributes to the contraction
of inequality.
V. CONCLUSION
This article used a KW framework to exam-
ine the relationship between liquidity, produc-
tivity, and the distribution of income. A novel
methodology allowed us to study the dynamics
of the KW economy not only around a station-
ary state, but also when the initial position of
the economy is far from it. Macroeconomic and
development experiments hinted at the breadth
of possible applications. One experiment inter-
preted the effects of the quality of institutions
on development (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012)
as an issue of equilibrium selection driven by
an initial difference in the distribution of rents
across assets. The relatively more unequal econ-
omy chooses an equilibrium characterized by a
lower level of production and a lower frequency
of transactions—a result that we also related
to the explanation of Engerman and Sokoloff
IACOPETTA & MINETTI: ASSET DYNAMICS, LIQUIDITY 549
FIGURE 4
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(1997) about the development delay of Latin
America.
Onemacroexperiment showed that a reduction
of market frictions can boost average income and
help reduce income disparity. Another macroex-
periment considered the effects of an alteration of
the asset returns on liquidity, on the level of pro-
duction, and on income distribution.We observed
that the simulated economies exhibited a rela-
tively low level of inequality: their income Gini
index was between a quarter and a half of the
one reported for the most egalitarian countries
because the only sources of inequality considered
are the marketability and the returns of assets.
The model suggests that inequality originated
from capital income is compressed substantially
when assets become more liquid, because agents
find it more profitable to earn income from pro-
duction rather than from hoarding capital.
Finally, one may wonder how these results
are conditioned by the limited-storage capacity
assumption—agents can hold only one unit
of an indivisible asset at a time. Relaxing the
assumption, which, as noted in Section II, is
mostly motived by analytical convenience,
would, arguably, generate some convergence
in the average return of portfolio of the three
types of agents; consequently, some of the equi-
libria reviewed in Table 2 might not survive.
Nevertheless, as long as trading frictions remain
a significant part of the environment, such a
convergence would be limited, because market
transactions cannot level the playing field com-
pletely: individuals who produce assets with a
high return would still maintain, on average,
a return advantage. We note, however, that if
allowing for asset accumulation may cause
some equilibria to disappear, a similar result
could be obtained with an acceleration of the
frequency of trade. For instance, in model A
with a larger α only “speculative” or mixed
strategy steady state equilibria would survive
and the remaining frictions (difference in asset
returns, indivisibility, limit to accumulation, and
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differences in tastes) would matter little. While
such an operation is useful to test the limits of
the model, it also runs against the intuition that
frictions are part of the ordinary working of the
economy.
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